Introduction: Buddhist Argumentation by Tillemans, Tom
Introduction: Buddhist Argumentation
Tom J. F. Tillemans
Published online: 1 February 2008
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008
The present volume contains ten papers that were initially read at the conference of
the International Association for the Study of Argumentation in Amsterdam in 2006.
The conference convenors had rightly seen the interest that the study of non-
Western material should have for a broad-based and informed approach to
argumentation in the world and had thus proposed a panel on ‘‘Buddhist
Argumentation’’, providing an occasion for Buddhist Studies specialists to draw
attention to the interest of the material available and contribute to a future dialogue
on common interests. Our introduction here is designed to give something of a
working idea of the place of argumentation for Buddhists; we will take up the key
concepts figuring in the Buddhists’ own writings on argumentation, give some
historical and bibliographical orientation, and along the way highlight areas of
potential theoretical interest. The papers themselves will provide in depth treatments
of particular aspects and questions and, we are convinced, show the sophistication
and relevance of this non-Western material.
Let us say from the outset that we will use the term ‘‘Buddhist argumentation’’ to
cover both public activities, like debate, and internal reasoning processes, or
‘‘arguments in one’s head.’’ Taking the term in this wide sense is partly in keeping
with prominent Buddhists’ own theories, and is brought out by their term anuma¯na,
‘‘inference’’, under which they understand both the internal reasoning processes one
has ‘‘for oneself’’ (sva¯rtha) as well as the verbal presentations of this reasoning that
one formulates ‘‘for others’’ (para¯rtha), i.e., in public argumentation or debate. The
details will be developed below. That said, the gravest (and still not uncommon)
mistake is to think that there simply is no such thing as Buddhist argumentation and
reasoning, or if there is, it is of little significance, because Buddhists (or perhaps
genuine Buddhists)—so the oft-repeated story goes—do not value rational thinking
and argumentation, being supposedly engaged in another, more non-conceptual,
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approach to understanding in which argumentation has no place. The corollaries of
this unfortunate denigration are immediate. One needs only to look at the statement
of the British philosopher, Anthony Flew, about there not being argumentation in
Eastern Philosophy to realize that for many philosophers the supposed absence of
argumentation also meant the absence of philosophy tout court. Here is how Flew
put it, in somewhat embarrassingly candid fashion, in his Introduction to Western
Philosophy, published in 1971:
… philosophy, as the word is understood here, is concerned first, last and all
the time with argument. It is, incidentally, because most of what is labelled
Eastern Philosophy is not so concerned—rather than any reason of European
parochialism—that this book draws no materials from any source east of Suez
(Flew 1971, p. 36).
In fairness to Anthony Flew it could be said that much of what was popularly
labelled ‘‘Eastern Philosophy’’ in 1971—and indeed is often so labelled today in
publications proliferating in New Age bookstores—was hardly philosophy at all and
was too woolly to qualify as argumented or analytical thinking. That said, a more
accurate representation was probably already available in 1971 and certainly is
available now, so that the Flew-style dismissal is fortunately no longer acceptable.
The persistent Western depiction of Buddhism, or even Asian thought, as somehow
essentially meditative, irenic and beyond the fray of argument is probably due more
to contemporary needs to idealize the East than balanced, informed intellectual
history. It suffices to look at the Upanis:ads’ arguments about the Self, Nya¯ya
literature on the canons of right thinking and reasoning, the Jain literature on logic
and epistemology (prama¯n: a), the intricate metaphysical arguments on the problem
of universals, the debates about philosophy of language issues, the Brahmanical
proofs for the existence of a Creator (ı¯s´vara), and many other such matters to realize
that argumentation and philosophical analysis have a huge role all through Indian
thought. One can equally cite numerous texts in Chinese to show that there too
argumentation and philosophy were alive and well in Buddhist,1 Daoist, Mohist and
Confucian thinkers. Tibetan literature is full of sophisticated arguments and theories
about arguments,2 as are Pali texts of Therava¯da Buddhist schools.
In short, Buddhist thinkers, like their non-Buddhist rivals, have been deeply
concerned with logical and rhetorical issues of good and bad reasoning: What
follows from what? Which reasons are probative? When are generalizations
warranted? What is persuasive to whom? They have also been concerned with
questions about how to argue in public, how to clinch debates, which tactics are
bona fide, what relevance scripture and school allegiance might have in a debate,
etc. They have engaged in elaborate arguments on philosophy of logic, language,
metaphysics and ethics, including East–West issues such as the problem of
1 No doubt Far Eastern Buddhist schools, like the Faxiang (‘‘characters of the elements,’’ *dharmal-
aks:an: a) school of Xuanzang and Kuiji in the Tang Dynasty, did have a considerable theoretical literature
on the canons of argumentation. The distinct contributions and character of this Chinese yinmingxue
(‘‘study of reasoning’’) are, alas, out of the scope of this volume.
2 On Tibetan Tshad ma literature (i.e., epistemology and logic), see e.g., Dreyfus (1997), Tillemans
(1999), Hugon (2002), van der Kuijp (1983).
2 T. J. F. Tillemans
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universals, technical matters such as problems of identity, referential opacity and the
Liar paradox, and key issues of the philosophy of mind, such as mind-matter
dualism, mental causation and reflexive awareness, to take but a few examples.
Of course, the concern with argumentation, reasoning and philosophy varied
from one Buddhist school to another and even from one region or historical period
to another. It is clear that within India, Tibet and China there were schools of
Buddhist thought that questioned the general value of argumentation and reasoning,
emphasizing instead ritual, devotion, yogic exercises and/or meditation, and that the
place and religious value of reasoning even became itself a debated topic
differentiating traditions of Buddhism. Nonetheless, this certainly should not be
exaggerated: much of the most important Indo–Tibetan Buddhist literature was
chock-full of argumentation, with a scrupulous attention to logic, epistemology and
precise use of language.3 In this vein too, it is interesting to see that already in early
literature on debate, Buddhists found compelled to defend vigourously the ethical
value of argumentation—see the discussion in the Fang Bian Xin Lun (translated in
this volume in the article by Brendan Gillon), where we see strong Buddhist defense
of the practice of debate against the charge from an anonymous opponent that
debate is just an exercise in immoral self-promotion, vanity and aggression. The
reply that this need not be so and that there are high-minded debates is a recurrent
Buddhist position.
Buddhist schools were thus strong in their advocacy of argumentation as a
legitimate and necessary activity in which sincere truth-seekers should engage.
Moreover, it was promoted as leading to truths independently of reliance upon
scripture, school affiliations and dogma. Indeed in the theoretical literature on
debate (va¯da) and epistemology (prama¯n: a), argumentation and reasoning take clear
priority over faith and sectarian allegiance. The Buddhist recognized that if it were
otherwise there would be a clear danger of circularity, for argumentation and
reasoning were deemed to constitute the tests as to whether the scriptures and
doctrines promoted by a school were true; the Buddhists thus maintained that the
school’s doctrines and scriptural passages could have no role in their own
evaluations (Tillemans 2000, pp. 78–80; on Buddhist scriptural argumentation see
Tillemans 1993, 1999, Ch. 1–3).
Granted certain non-Buddhists (e.g., Bhartr:hari) maintained that scripture was
more reliable and that it trumped reasoning, i.e., ‘‘inference’’ (anuma¯na). The
Buddhist’s position, however, was strikingly opposed to this: objective inference
that was based on facts (vastubalapravr: tta) was the means, and the only means, that
rival parties could use to adjudicate factual matters: scriptures were just words and,
as such, had no connection with facts. At least in their theoretical literature on
3 What about magic and the use of miracles? How much of a place did they have? The tactic of settling
philosophical issues by overpowering the opponent supernaturally was—as Cabezo´n shows in examining
the accounts of famous Buddhist debates and debaters (e.g., Digna¯ga, As´vaghos:a, A¯ryadeva and others)—
not prized by Buddhists to anything like the degree it seems to have been by non-Buddhists. See Cabezo´n,
this volume, no. 26: ‘‘Magic is at most a means to confirm a victory gotten by verbal or rational means. In
the Buddhist texts being examined here, using magic as a means to victory is tantamount to cheating, or
else, as in the case of Digna¯ga, the way in which defeated non-Buddhists exact revenge on their Buddhist
opponents.’’
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debate and epistemology, Buddhists consistently advocated an ideal version of
reasoning as objective, dispassionate and capable of attaining truth without prior
faith commitments or even affiliation with a philosophical or religious school of
thought. As Sara McClintock shows in her article in this volume, these Buddhist
theoreticians speak at length of a model philosopher, the ‘‘judicious person’’
(preks: a¯vant): it is this type of ideal person who would reason in such a pure, neutral
fashion, by objective inference.
An advocate of the irenic nature of all things genuinely Buddhist might reply that
argument and reasoning should be relevant to Buddhists only in their relations with
other rival schools (Buddhist or non-Buddhist),4 and that a practicing Buddhist—the
most extreme case being a meditator in solitary retreat in the mountains—would not
have any use for discriminative thought processes and their verbalizations to
develop her own understanding of the truth and liberate herself from the clutches of
sam: sa¯ra (the realm of rebirth and suffering). Again the idea would resonate with
many popular Western depictions of Buddhism. But although some Tibetan and
Chinese thinkers would side with this picture,5 it is largely wrong as a depiction of
mainstream Indo–Tibetan scholastic Buddhism.6 Many major Indian Buddhist
schools and their Tibetan successors saw argumentation, conceptual analysis and
epistemological reflection as not merely outwardly oriented, but as an important,
even integral, part of a Buddhist’s own spiritual practice. For them argumentation
and analysis was not just used in relations with the ‘‘heretics,’’ or non-Buddhist
world, or with other rival Buddhist schools, but had an indispensable personal focus
as a method for the Buddhist himself to overcome his own ignorance and doubts
about doctrinal matters, and especially to deepen his understanding about the
ultimate status of all phenomena, i.e., their emptiness, or lack of any inherent
properties that make them what they are. The Buddhist also reasoned internally and,
in effect, argued with himself. As we see in scholastic texts on Buddhist meditation,
such as Kamalas´ı¯la’s Bha¯vana¯krama, the goal may have been an irenic non-
conceptual understanding of emptiness, but the path to it was not.
A brief look at the Buddhist theoretical literature on how to argue and reason
rightly. The first such literature on argumentation for Buddhists was the debate
manuals, i.e., the treatises on va¯da of such famous authors as Vasubandhu, Asa _nga,
Digna¯ga, and Dharmakı¯rti. These manuals, with titles like Va¯davidhi (Rules of
Debate), Va¯davidha¯na (Methods of Debate), Va¯danya¯ya (Logic of Debate), were
often surprisingly practical and gave explicit rules and procedures for what had to be
4 Note that the defense of debate in the early text, the Fang Bian Xin Lun (translated in this volume by
Brendan Gillon), does seem to go in this direction—debate is useful to spread the doctrine and defend it
from confused and malicious adversaries. Other, generally later texts, see a kind of internalized
argumentation as also having value for oneself, or as even being indispensable for one’s own spiritual
progress.
5 The issue comes up as the subject of a very important debate in the early history of Tibetan Buddhism,
i.e., the famous 8th century debate pitting the quietist Chinese monk, Hvashang, (and some Tibetan
followers) against the camp of the ‘‘mainstream’’ Indian pan:d: it, Kamalas´ı¯la. See Demie´ville (1987) and
Seyfort Ruegg (1989).
6 For a study of Indo–Tibetan scholasticism, see Cabezo´n (1994). For the question of the scholasticism’s
view of the connection between epistemology and spiritual matters, see Steinkellner (1982), Tillemans
(1993).
4 T. J. F. Tillemans
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said and when. Questions of fairness in argumentation, legitimate tactics,
motivation, evaluation and so forth came up frequently.7 By the 5th century C.E.,
justificatory issues of knowledge-claims came to the fore, giving rise to the
literature concerning prama¯n: a, ‘‘instruments/means of knowledge’’, or less literally,
‘‘epistemology.’’ The key text that begins this epistemological turn is the
Prama¯n: asamuccaya of Digna¯ga (6th C.); this text then leads to the Prama¯n: ava¯rttika
and other works of Dharmakı¯rti (7th C.) with their considerable commentarial
literature both in India and in Tibet. It is fair to say that after Dharmakı¯rti the va¯da
literature diminishes in importance, being superseded by epistemology, as is
evidenced by the fact the subject of public debate tends to become one chapter
amongst others in larger works on prama¯n: a that deal with various issues of right
reasoning and knowledge-claim justification, including issues such as the reliability
of perception, testimony and scripture.
Turning to basic notions, the way the va¯da and prama¯n: a literature, and many
other types of texts, represent the mental process of reasoning is that one thinks: ‘‘A
is B because of being C, like D,’’ where one invokes a logical reason, or grounding
property (hetu), C, to prove the truth of the conclusion A is B. The example D,
which is actually sometimes omitted, is a commonly acknowledged case of B-ness
and C-ness that permits an individual to understand that all C’s are indeed B’s. (The
indispensability or dispensability of the example becomes a hotly debated topic
amongst later theoreticians.) There is also an important variant on this form where
the truth of A is B is not being established, but only the fact that it would follow
from an acceptance of C. Thus, we can have a type of use of reductio ad absurdum
known as prasa _nga, or tarka: ‘‘It would follow absurdly that A would be B, because
of being C.’’ Both these structures are to be found in Indian and Tibetan writing on a
variety of subjects.
Since Stcherbatsky’s (1958) two volume study and translation of Dharmakı¯rti’s
Nya¯yabindu, entitled Buddhist Logic, one often sees the Buddhist theory of reasons/
grounding properties designated as ‘‘logic’’, a term that sometimes has the unwanted
effect of leading readers to think that good reasons for Buddhists are simply those
that are formally valid. In fact, the notion of formal validity (i.e., the conclusion’s
being guaranteed true, provided the premises are true) is not itself explicitly
discussed by Buddhist theoreticians; it is in any case not distinguished from other,
more informal, considerations.
Instead of formally valid reasons, Buddhist theoreticians developed the notion of
a good reason (saddhetu, Tibetan rtags yang dag), i.e., one which satisfies a triple
criterion (trairu¯pya). These three criteria for ‘‘goodness’’ are given in the following
fashion from Dharmakı¯rti on:
(a) paks:adharmatva (the logical reason’s being a property of the subject): the
subject, A, is ascertained as having the property C.
(b) anvayavya¯pti (positive concomitance): C is ascertained as present in only
instances similar to A insofar as they possess B,
7 For the Va¯davidhi, see Frauwallner (1982). See also the Nya¯yapraves´a, translated and explained in
Tachikawa (1971), a text which is quite close in spirit to Digna¯ga’s va¯da work, the Nya¯yamukha. See also
the article by Brendan Gillon in his volume for an example of an even earlier Buddhist va¯da text.
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(c) vyatirekavya¯pti (negative concomitance): C is ascertained as wholly absent
from instances dissimilar to A insofar as they do not possess B.
True, in texts like the Hetucakra of Digna¯ga, a version of the triple criterion
(trairu¯pya) for good reasons and the operators ‘‘partial presence’’, ‘‘complete
presence’’, ‘‘complete absence’’ were correlated to yield a series of nine types of
reasons, types that are abstracted from content and subject matter. Not inappro-
priately, the great historian of logic, Innocentius Bochenski, in the chapter on Indian
Logic in his History of Formal Logic, stated that the Hetucakra thus suggested an
awareness of formal considerations. Chi (1984), in his Buddhist Formal Logic, went
several steps further and attempted to show that the Hetucakra, taken in its formal
aspects, might present a number of interesting features to a modern logician. That
being said, there is much more to ‘‘good reasons’’ satisfying the triple criterion than
simple formal validity: the term ‘‘ascertained’’ (nis´cita), when unpacked by
Dharmakı¯rti and his commentators, demands that good reasons must be sound (i.e.,
the premises must in fact be true and the conclusion must follow from them), that
the opponent must know they are sound, and that they must be convincing to the
opponent who has the appropriate ‘‘desire to know’’ (jijn˜a¯sa¯) something he does not
already know. This latter demand leads to a host of other requirements: in order to
be convinced of something new the opponent must have the requisite doubt,
understand the terms and accept the subject of debate. In short, good reasons involve
formal considerations (what follows from what?8); factual considerations (what is
so? what is true?); epistemic considerations (what does one need to know in order to
know such and such? when is doubt possible?); and what can be termed ‘‘rhetorical
considerations’’ (what is newly convincing to whom?). The weighting of these
aspects in the theory of the trairu¯pya also changes over history: at certain points
what were factual matters—e.g., the de facto absence of the reason in the similar
instances in the case of certain rather special types of arguments—become epistemic
matters—e.g., that one cannot know the reason to be present in the similar
instances.9
Later theoretical elaborations by Digna¯ga, Dharmakı¯rti et al. about how to
present publicly a good reason (saddhetu) to an adversary in a debate prescribe the
8 Actually, Buddhists seem to have differed significantly on whether satisfaction of the triple criterion
guaranteed the truth of the proposition to be proved, i.e., that the proposition must be true if the reason
satisfies the requisite triple criterion. Up until and including Digna¯ga, it seems that Buddhists
acknowledged that there could be certain types of good reasons, e.g., the so-called ‘‘antinomic reasons’’
(viruddha¯vyabhica¯rin), that nonetheless lacked this feature of guaranteed truth conservation and proved
two opposing conclusions. With Dharmakı¯rti, however, this scenario of reasons satisfying the triple
characteristic for two opposing conclusions is thought to be impossible. See Tillemans (2000, pp. 92–95),
concerning ‘‘antinomic reasons’’. See also Oetke (1996) on the question of whether Indian logic is
monotonic or non-monotonic (i.e., promoting guaranteed truth conservation or not).
9 The reasoning in question is the notorious asa¯dha¯ran: a¯naika¯ntikahetu (reason which is uncertain
because of being too exclusive), which occurs when the subject A is coextensive with the reason C.
Taking the epistemic interpretation of the problem, it is said to be impossible to know that all C’s are B,
because there is no example, D, of a C and B which is not A. The factual interpretation is to say that C’s
are not present in the similar instances because such instances should be similar to A in possessing B, but
should not actually themselves be A’s. See Kajiyama (1958), Tillemans (1999, Ch. 5).
6 T. J. F. Tillemans
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use of complex structures known as prayoga (formal reasonings).10 Thus, for
example, the standard formal reasoning that Dharmakı¯rti and his Indo–Tibetan
successors prescribed was a two membered quasi-syllogism, known as an
‘‘inference-for-others’’ (para¯rtha¯numa¯na):
All C’s are B’s, like D.
A is C.
Commentators make an explicit correlation with the triple criterion (trairu¯pya).
Thus the first statement perspicuously expresses the positive and negative
concomitance (anvayavya¯pti, vyatirekavya¯pti) and the second expresses the fact
of the reason being a property of the subject (paks:adharmata¯). The conclusion, A is
B, is, curiously enough, omitted in these later prescriptive accounts of how
Buddhists should argue. This is supposedly because the only function of such a form
is to show ‘‘provers’’ (sa¯dhana), and a conclusion cannot prove itself: A is B, i.e.,
‘‘what is to be proved’’ (sa¯dhya), will be understood indirectly.
This prescribed form is typically used when an author seeks to show rigour and
legitimacy through conformity with theory. It is, however, only sparingly used in
the ‘‘working argumentation’’ found in most philosophical texts and it is not clear at
all how often it was used in actual oral debates in India. The little evidence that we
do have of such debates in India tends to show that they were not particularly formal
and rigorous; in Tibet there is some evidence that certain monasteries (probably
seeking conformity with Indian strictures) did advocate a two-membered formal
reasoning, but in any case the actual form of debate that became so prevalent
and important in Tibet, what is often termed the ‘‘logic of sequence and reason’’ or
‘‘thal-phyir logic’’, is quite different from these inferences-for-others and consists
rather in a sophisticated variant upon the ‘‘A is B because of C’’ structure (see
Dreyfus, Hugon, Liberman, present volume. See also Tillemans 1999, Ch. 6).
This much will have to do for a basic understanding of the key notions. For a
more ample traditional account, the best starting point, in our opinion, still remains
Moks:a¯karagupta’s Tarkabha¯s: a¯, a sophisticated but accessible late Indian Buddhist
text that Yuichi Kajiyama translated and explained under the title, An Introduction
to Buddhist Philosophy (Kajiyama 1966).
The articles in this volume. The reader unfamiliar with the history of
argumentation, logic and epistemology in India can profitably begin by consulting
the article of Brendan Gillon, ‘‘An Early Buddhist Text on Logic: Fang Bian Xin
Lun.’’11 Gillon gives a sample translation of a Buddhist debate manual that may
10 The above form of the inference-for-others is certainly not the only form that Indian thinkers
advocated: pre-Dharmakı¯rti Buddhists did advocate a three-membered form including a statement of the
conclusion; non-Buddhist Naiya¯yikas advocated a five-membered form; there were even some thinkers
who prescribed a formal reasoning with ten members including statements of what is in doubt, the goal of
the argument, the possibility of a solution, etc.! What we find is that a considerable amount of
sophisticated philosophy of logic and argumentation is done over precisely those issues of what should
and should not figure in a formal reasoning, as generally the answers to those types of questions will, for
Indian thinkers, be based on a larger conception of what logic is and how reasoning functions. See
Tillemans (1999, Ch. 4).
11 The bibliography is also valuable in this regard. A sample of some other reference works:
E. Frauwallner’s various articles on Indian logic in his Kleine Schriften; Hattori (1968), Oberhammer
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have been written by Na¯ga¯rjuna (2nd–3rd Century C.E.), although the Sanskrit title
is unknown and the text is only extant in Chinese translation. The interest of the text
is that it was probably written well before Asa _nga and Vasubandhu (4th and 5th
Century C.E.), who are the earliest identified authors of Buddhist va¯da texts. Gillon
precedes his translation with a background section summarizing major develop-
ments in the early period. He also discusses in a nuanced fashion in what sense
Indian logic is logic. For Gillon, there can, in general, be logics elaborated from an
ontic point of view, an epistemic point of view, a dialectic point of view or a
linguistic point of view. Indian (and hence also Buddhist) thinking on logic
proceeds in the terms of the ontic, epistemic and dialectic, but did not pursue a
linguistic account, as one finds often in modern logic. It investigated the conditions
under which one set of facts required the existence of another, one type of
knowledge required or permitted another and one acceptance required another, but
not the conditions under which one statement could be derived from another.12
Sara McClintock, in ‘‘Rhetoric and the Reception Theory of Rationality in the
Work of Two Buddhist Philosophers,’’ examines the Buddhist ideal of the
preks: a¯vant ‘‘judicious person’’, or preks: a¯pu¯rvaka¯rin, ‘‘person who undertakes an
investigation prior [to acting]’’, who engages in debate in a purely cooperative, non-
aggressive, effort to seek truth. This ideal individual is the model thinker promoted
at length by the 8th century Indian Buddhist authors, S´a¯ntaraks:ita and Kamalas´ı¯la,
who followed in the footsteps of the Buddhist epistemologist, Dharmakı¯rti.
McClintock looks at the ‘‘New Rhetoric’s’’ key notion of a rhetorically constructed
‘‘universal audience’’ to which philosophers implicitly address their arguments; she
seeks to understand what constitutes the universal audience for the two Buddhist
thinkers in question and finds that it is essentially one composed of judicious people,
i.e., ideal people who embody the standards of rationality. She concludes by
considering the ways in which S´a¯ntaraks:ita and Kamalas´ı¯la may be seen as
embracing a rhetorical conception of reason.
Georges Dreyfus, in ‘‘What is Debate for? The Rationality of Tibetan Debates
and the Role of Humor,’’ examines Tibetan monastic debate as practiced in the
Geluk (dge lugs) scholastic education up to the present day. The ideal of debate in
Tibet seems essentially similar to that advocated in the Indian theoretical literature
(cf. the article by McClintock): argumentation and reasoning are used to gain
Footnote 11 continued
(1991), Kajiyama (1989), Matilal (1971, 1998) as well as the introduction to Matilal and Evans (1986),
Mimaki (1976), Dreyfus (1997). There are also articles (and short bibliographies) on Indian logic,
philosophy of language and epistemology in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Craig,
London, 1998. See also the issue on Buddhist logic in G. Paul (editor), Ho¯rin. Vergleichende Studien zur
Japanischen Kultur 11, Du¨sseldorf, 2005.
12 This is certainly right: a typical investigation for Buddhist thinkers is to enquire how it is that one fact
‘‘establishes’’ another, or to use the Sanskrit terms, how such and such a thing is a sign (li _nga, evidence)
for another. Cf. Dharmakı¯rti’s rejection of the linguistic perspective in favour of the ontic in
Prama¯n: ava¯rttika IV, k. 15 (Tillemans 2000, pp. 26–27): ‘‘One understands one state of affairs from
another. Thus the statements of the thesis and reason have no power with regard to the state of affairs [in
question, i.e., that which is being proved]. Hence, these two [statements] do not, in themselves, constitute
means of proof (sa¯dhana).’’ (artha¯d arthagateh: s´aktih: paks:ahetvabhidha¯nayoh: /na¯rthe tena tayor na¯sti
svatah: sa¯dhanasam: sthitih: //)
8 T. J. F. Tillemans
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well-founded conviction in the truth of the Buddhist positions and scriptures. And
pedagogically this ideal translates into an ‘‘edificatory progression toward the
formation of the person on the basis of a rational inquiry leading to an increasing
certainty’’ (Dreyfus, this volume). Nonetheless, in practice Geluk debate invariably
involves intrusive rhetorical elements, such as humor, that prima facie might not
seem to fit with the ideals. Dreyfus begins by detailing the rules and procedures of
Geluk debates. The intrusive elements that he investigates escape the codification
and rules of debate, but are nevertheless integral to its practice and even partake
deeply of its goals. In parallel to the ideal edificatory progression where debate is to
generate well-founded certainty, the practice of debate, and its resultant destabi-
lization, leads to the development of a sense of the fragility and tentativeness of all
interpretations (see also Dreyfus 2003).
Kenneth Liberman, in ‘‘Sophistry In and As its Course,’’ also examines features
of actual Geluk monastic debates. He sees these debates as providing evidence for
the wider thesis that sophistry and good philosophical reasoning, though they may
be distinguished theoretically and normatively, are never separate in actual
philosophical practice. Whether sophistry helps or hinders reason is not primarily
due to recurring features stemming from the natue of sophistry (if any), but rather to
what debaters actually do with it. Thus, focusing on Tibetan debate, where sophistry
is used in a skillful and controlled manner, Liberman uses ethnomethodological
methods to investigate when and how sophistry is profitably used to enhance and
develop philosophical understanding by closing down ‘‘dead-ends’’ and opening
new perspectives. Liberman transcribes and analyzes actual Tibetan debates,
looking at how order is created, how clarification proceeds, how demands for
consistency operate and how at key stages the tables are brusquely turned in a
constructive fashion (see also Liberman 2004).
In ‘‘Buddhist Narratives of the Great Debates,’’ Jose´ Cabezo´n examines Chinese
and Tibetan narrative accounts of great Indian Buddhist debates, looking especially
at historical and hagiographical literature. Cabezo´n does not treat these narratives of
debate as themselves rigorous history, nor as legend, but as a literary form, part of a
theme of contests (verbal and magical) by which the great Indian Buddhists
vanquished their opponents. Whereas philosophical literature often gives a detailed
account of the content, the narrative literature creates tales of heroes, suspense,
divine intervention, intrigue, and punishing defeats; with these stories of exploits,
Buddhists develop their sense of identity as people having a shared relationship with
the Indian past. As Cabezo´n suggests, the narratives of debates are also themselves
forms of argument, arguments that invoke (real or legendary) events in the life of
philosophers to make the case for the philosophical positions that these scholars held.
Pascale Hugon, in ‘‘Arguments by Parallels in the Epistemological Works of
Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge,’’ takes up a style of Buddhist argumentation that became
frequent in certain Tibetan circles, i.e., elaborate arguments by parallels and
analogies. Because the works of Cha-ba Cho¨-kyi Seng-gay (Phya pa chos kyi seng
ge 1109–1169) were until recently unavailable, a number of fanciful claims had
been regularly made about him being the founder of the peculiarly Tibetan thal-
phyir (‘‘logic of sequence and reason’’) type of argumentation used in Geluk debates
from about the 16th century onwards. In fact, as Hugon shows, his style of
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argumentation was quite different and much less rule-bound. Cha-ba is not, therefore,
likely to be the founder of the ‘‘logic of sequence and reason’’ so characteristic of
modern Tibetan monastic debates. What we see is that argumentation in Tibet also
often proceded in a tit-for-tat fashion, with one party offering a parallel, the other party
disputing the parallel or offering a counter-parallel and so forth.
Assertion: P
Reply: ‘‘No, because if P were so, then P0 would be so, since it is analogous to P’’
Rejoinder: ‘‘No, P0 is not analogous, because…’’.
This type of argumentation by parallels is not given any substantial theoretical
role in Indian va¯da and prama¯n: a literature, although it (or some variant upon it)
may also have been quite prevalent in India. It does, however, present an intricate
structure that Hugon brings out in her article.
In ‘‘Classes of Agent and the Moral Logic of the Pali Canon,’’ Martin Adam seeks
to investigate Buddhist ethical reasoning as found in the early Buddhist writings of the
Pali Canon. He looks at two Pali terms, ‘‘meritorious/merit’’ (pun˜n˜a) and ‘‘whole-
some/wholesomeness’’ (kusala) that occur as the basic vocabulary used in contexts
describing good actions. These terms are to be understood in relation to three different
types of agents, i.e., (a) ordinary beings (puthujjana), who are unfamiliar with
selflessness, (b) disciples in higher training (sekha), who have had a first experience of
selflessness but have not yet attained nirva¯n:a, and (c) liberated beings (arahant), who
have attained nirva¯n:a, eliminating all rebirth by extirpating the wrong view that there
is a self as well as all desires conditioned by such a wrong view. Martin Adam argues
that as people’s conduct and their reasoning about such conduct is distinguishable on
the basis of their proximity to nirva¯n:a (nibba¯na), notions of goodness will also vary in
function of types of agents: meritorious actions are those that lead to better rebirths—
the typical concern of an ordinary being; wholesome actions are conducive to
nirva¯n:a—the concern of a disciple in higher training.
The three articles that close this volume are philosophical analyses of particular
issues that have significant connections with Western discussions. Mark Siderits, in
‘‘Contradiction in Buddhist Argumentation,’’ challenges the idea that (some or all)
Buddhists interestingly flaunt or explicitly reject the law of non-contradiction. The
idea that they deliberately do, or at least that some of the more radical amongst them
do, has a long history with illustrious advocates, including Edward Conze, Hajime
Nakamura, Jacques May, and others. Recently the philosopher, Jay Garfield and the
logician, Graham Priest, in their joint article, ‘‘Na¯ga¯rjuna and the Limits of
Thought’’, have given this idea new life by arguing that certain Buddhists have seen
that there are genuine paradoxes when dealing with totalities of entities.13 To make
sense of this, Garfield and Priest rely on paraconsistent logic, i.e., formalizations of
logic that do not allow everything to follow from a contradiction. Na¯ga¯rjuna was
(at least implicitly or in a reconstruction of his philosophy) an advocate of
‘‘dialetheism’’, i.e., the position that some contradictions are true—for some
statement u, u & not-u is true.
13 The joint article appears both in Priest (2002) and in Garfield (2002).
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Garfield and Priest seek to argue that some statements of contradictions in
Na¯ga¯rjuna’s Madhyamaka (‘‘Middle Way’’) philosophy can best be taken as true,
notably those along the lines of ‘‘the intrinsic nature of things is that they have no
intrinsic nature’’, implying that things both do and do not have intrinsic natures.
Siderits argues that such types of Na¯ga¯rjunian statements are not asserting that
things, as they ultimately/intrinsically are, are contradictory, but that these
statements bring out a general presupposition failure in realist discussions: there
is no ultimate way things are at all that will serve as the subject matter for various
predicates. Relying on Paul Grice’s idea of conversational implicatures, Siderits
argues that a contradictory formulation may have the conversational implicature
that the presupposed subject matter (i.e., how things are intrinsically) is lacking—
this, according to Siderits, would the best reading of Na¯ga¯rjuna, rather than a
reading where Na¯ga¯rjuna would accept that there is a contradictory way in which
things intrinsically are.
Dan Arnold, in ‘‘Transcendental Arguments and Practical Reason in Indian
Philosophy’’, looks at the non-Buddhist Mı¯ma¯m: saka and Buddhist Madhyamaka uses
of a type of argumentation that is similar to Kantian transcendental arguments—
arguments whose conclusion cannot be challenged without self-contradiction; the
truth of the conclusion would be a condition for such a challenge to be even possible.
In short, transcendental arguments seek to establish that a necessary condition of a
challenge to a claim’s intelligibility is that the claim must be true. Let us focus on the
Madhyamaka Buddhist’s argument: the Mı¯ma¯m: saka argument has similar structural
features, even if its doctrinal standpoint is quite different.14
The Madhyamaka, when confronted with a realist’s challenge to his claim that
things lack any intrinsic nature, has an elaborate reply designed to show that if
things actually had intrinsic natures, no true, or even intelligible, statement or
judgment would ever occur, including the realist’s challenge. The point is that
statements and judgments—like everything else in the universe—are what they are
completely because of conditioning by other things; having an intrinsic nature
would preclude them from being products of the conditions that make them what
they are, so that if they had intrinsic natures they simply could not arise and
function.
The realist’s challenge is thus not possible without the truth of the Madhyamaka
claim. But in what sense is it not possible? Is the truth of the Madhyamaka
(or Mı¯ma¯m: saka) claim logically necessary and its challenge logically impossible; is
the Madhyamaka claim, then, what a Kantian could term a truth of theoretical
reason? Arnold argues that this is not the sense of necessity and possibility at stake:
rather, the truth of the Madhyamaka (and Mı¯ma¯m: saka) claims is because challenge
is a performative, or practical, self-contradiction. To take an analogy: a modern-day
Western materialist challenge to the existence of minds or to thinking subjects
incurs the problem that, if it is right, one cannot imagine how I could actually think
of such a challenge. Eliminative materialists, of course, deal with such problems by
14 Faced with a challenge by certain Buddhists, who hold that all relations between words and objects are
man-made, the Mı¯ma¯m: saka argues that language learning presupposes that not every word–object
relation is arbitrary, and that there must always be some language where the word–object relation is
fixed—failing that the Buddhist challenge itself would end up meaningless.
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seeing them as erroneous hold-overs from outdated folk theories, so that the
supposed requirements of practical reason are superseded by the advances of
theoretical reason. As Arnold argues, the Madhyamaka has a different stance and
privileges the worlds’ practical requirements, which are immune to theoretical
attack: practical trumps theoretical reason for Madhyamaka.
Finally, Tom Tillemans, in ‘‘Reason, Irrationality and Akrasia (weakness of the
will) in Buddhism: Reflections upon S´a¯ntideva’s Arguments with Himself’’, looks at
the place Buddhists accord to a type of irrationality in their behavior and thinking.
In particular, he focuses upon a recurring theme in the writings of the 8th century
Buddhist thinker, S´a¯ntideva, who subjects his own behavior and thought to minute
scrutiny in argumentation with himself, only to be confronted with the fact that he
seems to persist irrationally in ways of thinking that he knows to be wrong and that
he pursues actions he knows to be worse courses. The problem and puzzlement
surrounding pursuit of error and worse courses are profitably comparable to issues
of akrasia, weakness of the will, that are taken up by Plato, Aristotle and many
modern philosophers, including notably Donald Davidson and David Wiggins.
While taking S´a¯ntideva seriously suggests that at least some important Buddhists
were ‘‘bitten’’ by problems of akrasia, there is in certain modern representations of
Buddhism as an ‘‘art of happiness’’ a tendency to dismiss seemingly knowing
choices of worse courses as just in fact cases of ignorance—one does not really
believe in or know the best course (i.e., the one maximizing happiness/utility), for if
one did one would invariably pursue it. This too is reminiscent of the Socratic
defense of human beings’ rationality, one that dismisses akrasia as a pseudo-
phenomenon. Tillemans in the latter half of the article seeks to show that there are,
on a charitable reading of Maha¯ya¯nist Buddhist philosophical literature, the makings
of a complex theoretical account of akrasia that does not explain away the all too
human phenomena of genuine conflict and knowing choice of worse courses.
Concluding reflections. We began by dismissing the all too widespread ideas that
argumentation is (or should be) absent from Buddhism, or that it should be absent
from Buddhist practice, etc. Looking at the papers in this volume, it seems that there
are two distinguishable sets of questions to pursue if we are to do justice to the place
of argument and reasoning in Buddhism: (a) What are the Buddhists’ theoretical
accounts, in their literature on debate and epistemology, about how people should
argue for positions, refute opponents, reason rightly and justify truth-claims?15
(b) What are the Buddhists’ actual approaches and attitudes to argumentation and
reasoning? This involves examining their philosophical, religious and ethical
discussions, the role of debate in actual practice in educational institutions, the
literary representation of debates and debaters, the historical accounts of debates, etc.
The initial articles dealt largely with the first set of concerns. Subsequently, it
was the second set of concerns that predominated in this volume. There is, of
course, overlap and even some tension between the two, but significantly there are a
number of questions about Buddhists’ ways of reasoning that are only partially
answerable by plumbing Buddhist theoretical treatises on debate and epistemology.
15 For a bibliography of translations, editions and studies of the Indian Buddhist literature on debate and
epistemology, see Steinkellner and Much (1995).
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As we can see by the articles in this volume, investigations of actual Buddhist
argumentation will typically involve logical analysis (e.g., Does the Buddhist
respect such and such a theorem? What sort of necessity does he recognize, if any?);
questions of reasonableness (e.g., What are the Buddhists’ actual standards? Does
he recognize any interesting role for thought and behavior that seems in conflict
with reason?); rhetorical aspects (e.g., What is convincing to whom?); the use of
argumentation in Buddhist centers of learning (e.g., What pedagogical role does
debate have? What role is played by sophistry, humor, polemics?); the literary
representation of argumentation (e.g., How are the debates and debaters depicted in
narrative accounts and hagiographies?). It is highly unlikely that purely philological
and historical research centered on va¯da and prama¯n: a literature can provide
adequate answers to such questions. Several contributions in this volume engage in
extensive philosophical and logical analysis using Western notions, some in
sociological and ethnomethodological analyses and some analyze rhetorical and
literary aspects. All are attempts to treat Buddhist argumentation by making
rapprochements with wider theoretical concerns and methodologies. All take what
Buddhists say seriously in the way it deserves to be taken.
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